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When we perceive, we employ perceptual capacities by means of which we discriminate particulars in our environment. 
Seeing the red shade of an apple involves for example to employ one’s capacity to discriminate red from other colors. 
More generally, we can say that to be a perceiver is to possess certain capacities, to perceive is to employ those 
capacities, and employing perceptual capacities constitutes perceptual states.  
What are perceptual capacities? A perceptual capacity is a kind of discriminatory, selective capacity that we employ 
in perception, hallucination, or illusion. It is a low-level mental capacity that functions to differentiate, single out, and 
in some cases classify mind-independent particulars of a specific type—for example to discriminate and single out 
instances of red from instances of blue. While discriminating particulars can include classification, it does not require it. 
To say that perceptual capacities are low-level is not to say that they are subpersonal, but rather that they are 
cognitively less high-level than concepts (at least on most philosophical accounts of concepts). Perceptual capacities 
come in many varieties: there are perceptual capacities to discriminate luminance, motion, quantities, size, pitch, tone, 
and distances to name just a few. Some capacities are more basic than others. Some stand in complex hierarchical 
structures. Some are always employed jointly with other capacities. 
Drawing on work in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and developmental psychology, this paper provides an 
analysis of perceptual capacities. It includes the following key elements: 
Function of a Perceptual Capacity: The function of a perceptual capacity Cα is to 
discriminate and single out mind-independent particulars α1, α2, 
α3, . . . αn, that is, particulars of a specific type. 
Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind-
independent particulars α1, α2, α3, . . . αn that the perceptual 
capacity functions to single out. 
Possession Condition: A subject S possesses a perceptual capacity Cα if and only if the 
following counterfactual is true of S: S would be in a position to 
discriminate and single out a particular α1, where α1 is any 
particular of the type that Cα functions to discriminate and single 
out, if S were perceptually related to α1, (i) assuming S is 
perceptually capable (awake, alert etc.), (ii) assuming no finking, 
masking, or other exotic case obtains, and (iii) where S being 
 perceptually related to α1 means that (a) the situational features 
are such that α1 is perceivable by S (good lighting conditions etc.), 
(b) S has the relevant sensory apparatus that allows her to gain 
information about α1, and (c) S is spatially and temporally related 
to α1 such that S is in a position to gain information about α1 via 
her sensory apparatus. 
Fallibility Condition: If a subject S employs a capacity Cα, Cα can either fulfill its 
function or fail to fulfill its function, such that there is no difference 
at the level of employing Cα but only a difference at the level of 
fulfilling its function. The function of Cα is fulfilled if by 
employing Cα a relevant particular is singled out. The function of 
Cα fails to be fulfilled if by employing Cα no relevant particular is 
singled out. 
Asymmetry Condition: The employment of a perceptual capacity Cα in cases in which Cα 
fulfills its function is metaphysically more basic than the 
employment of Cα in cases in which Cα fails to fulfill its function. 
Repeatability Condition: A necessary condition for Cα to be a perceptual capacity is that 
Cα is repeatable. 
Physical Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual capacity Cα, then there is a 
physical base of employing Cα that is constituted by physical 
processes, events, and structures (such as the neural activity) of S. 
Informational Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual capacity Cα, then there is 
an informational base of employing Cα that is constituted by the 
subpersonal psychological mechanism (information processing, 
computations, and other subpersonal functional states, events, and 
processes) of S. 
I will provide an asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual capacities that is built around these eight 
conditions. But first it will be helpful to give a brief history of the notion of capacity in cognitive science and philosophy, 
and to lay out the benefits of analyzing the mind in terms of mental capacities. 
1. Why Analyze the Mind in Terms of Mental Capacities? 
The notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain sciences. Driven by the idea that a 
cognitive system has the capacity it does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is standard to appeal 
to capacities in cognitive psychology.1 Critical in the advent of the notion of capacity in cognitive psychology was 
Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance, where a competence is a cognitive capacity, and a 
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 performance is generated by employing a competence. In the case of language, a competence is a tacit grasp of the 
structural properties of a language and the performance is the production of utterances (Chomsky 1995). 
In contrast to the centrality of capacities in psychology and the brain sciences, questions about mental capacities 
have been neglected in recent philosophical work. 2 2 This is surprising given their importance in the history of 
philosophy, in the work of Aristotle and Kant in particular. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, capacities and 
related concepts such as abilities, skills, powers, and categories featured prominently in philosophical and scientific work on 
perception. Indeed, it was standard to analyze the mind in terms of capacities. With the linguistic turn the norms changed 
and it became standard to analyze the mind in terms of representational content instead. No doubt the linguistic turn 
brought with it much clarity and precision. However, in sidelining capacities a great deal was lost. The good news is that we 
are not forced to choose between analyzing the mind in terms of capacities and analyzing it in terms of representational 
content. Indeed, I will argue that employing mental capacities constitutes the representational content of mental states. 
The main benefit of invoking capacities in an account of the mind is that it allows for an elegant counterfactual analysis of 
mental states: it allows us to analyze mental states on three distinct yet interrelated levels. 
1) A first level of analysis pertains to the function of mental capacities. 
2) A second level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, irrespective of the context in which 
they are employed. 
3) A third level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, taking into account the context in 
which they are employed. 
On the first level, we focus on the function of perceptual capacities, which is to discriminate and single out particulars of a 
specific type. A perceptual capacity has this function even if it is employed while failing to fulfill its function, as is the case 
in hallucination and illusion. Even in such a case, the capacity functions to discriminate and single out particulars of a 
specific type. Moreover, a perceptual capacity has this function even if it is more often than not employed while failing to 
fulfill its function. 
On the second level of analysis, we focus on what is in common between mental states in which the same perceptual 
capacities are employed. On this level, it is irrelevant whether or not a perceptual capacity is employed such that it fulfills 
its function. As I argue elsewhere, in perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal character, the 
same perceptual capacities are employed (Schellenberg 2018b). So on this second level of analysis, perceptions, 
hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal character are on a par. 
On the third level of analysis, we focus on the fact that perceptual capacities are employed in a specific environment, 
whereby a particular is either successfully singled out or the experiencing subject fails to single out a particular. In contrast 
to the second level, it matters, on this third level, whether or not a capacity is employed such that its function is fulfilled. So 
on this level, perceptions differ from hallucinations and illusions. This is the level of analysis on which we determine the 
token content of the relevant experiential state. 
 
2. The Function of Perceptual Capacities 
                                                      
2 There are notable exceptions. See, for example, Cartwright 1994 and Sosa 2010. 
 Perceptual capacities function to discriminate and single out particulars. More precisely: 
Function of a Perceptual Capacity: The function of a perceptual capacity Cα is to discriminate and single out 
mind-independent particulars α1, α2, α3, . . . αn, that is, particulars of a specific type. 
A particular, as understood here, is a mind-independent object, event, or property-instance. I use the notion of “singling 
out” rather than “referring” so as to remain neutral on whether perceptual capacities are conceptual or nonconceptual. 
While referring has been argued to require conceptual capacities, singling out particulars requires no such capacities. 
Singling out a particular can be understood as a proto-conceptual analogue of referring to a particular. Non-rational 
animals and infants as young as four months old can perceptually single out particulars in their environment, yet on at 
least some notions of “reference” they do not have the capacity to refer. Moreover, on many views of reference, 
referring to a particular presupposes that the relevant subject is in a mental state with content.3 While I will show that 
analyzing perceptual states as constituted by employing perceptual capacities entails that those perceptual states have 
representational content, we can remain neutral for now on whether perceptual experience has content. Thus, I use the 
term “singling out” so as not to presuppose a representational view.  
The notion of function in play is a notion of natural function. It is natural in that it is independent of interpretation. So 
what function a capacity has is not relative to an interpreter.4 There are many different kinds of perceptual capacities. There 
are perceptual capacities that function to discriminate and single out objects of a specific type. Others function to 
discriminate and single out property-instances of a specific type. Still others function to discriminate and single out 
events of a specific type. 
Natural functions can be given an etiological analysis; we can, however, work with the notion of a natural function while 
rejecting such an analysis. As I will argue, that is what we should do. According to etiological theories, something has a 
certain function because of what it is selected and adapted for (Ayala 1970, Wright 1973, Millikan 1989, Neander 1991).5 
Consider the heart’s function to pump blood. The etiological theory explains this function by pointing to the fact that 
hearts were selected for pumping blood. While this is no doubt how it causally came about that hearts have the function to 
pump blood, the fact that hearts have this function is neutral on how they came to have it. Even if hearts came to have 
their function by some other means, they could still have the function to pump blood. More generally, we should distinguish 
what function something has from how it came to have that function. What is crucial for an analysis of capacities is what 
function they have, not how they came to have it. 
In contrast to etiological theories, the view developed here is neutral on how mental capacities came to have their 
function. No doubt, we have the perceptual capacities that we do due to our phylogenetic and ontogenetic background. 
The point is that we can analyze the function of those capacities without appealing to how we came to have them. Indeed, 
there is no sense in which the phylogenetic or ontogenetic history of a subject is relevant for determining the function 
of her capacities. A subject who discriminates and singles out particulars in her environment via an implant can have 
perceptual capacities with the very same function as a subject who has those capacities due to her phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic background. While most mental capacities happen to have their function due to natural selection or some 
                                                      
3 For discussion, see Hawthorne and Manley 2012. 
4 For this reason, the account of capacities developed here does not face Dennett’s (1991) indeterminacy worries. 
5 For a critical discussion of etiological accounts of function, see Nanay 2010. As Nanay argues, such accounts are circular. 
 other natural process, nothing in the account developed here hinges on the matter. 
For this reason, the account of mental states developed here does not face well-known problems of etiological theories of 
mental content. It does not, for example, face the problem of how to account for complex capacities, the possession of 
which cannot be explained in terms of natural selection, adaptation, or meme selection. Moreover, by contrast to 
etiological accounts, it does not face Davidson’s Swampman objection (Davidson 1987: 443–4). Swampman is a 
creature that by astounding coincidence came into existence through a collision of particles caused by a lightning bolt. At 
the very same moment, Donald Davidson is struck by a lightning bolt and tragically dies. Swampman is a physical 
duplicate of Davidson, but his history is radically different. He did not partake in any evolutionary history, and there are no 
phylogenetic, ontogenetic, or other etiological ways to explain his mental states. For this reason, etiological accounts of 
function are forced to say that Swampman’s component parts do not have any functions. But according to capacitism, the 
view developed in the course of this book, a function is in no way dependent on the history of the subject employing the 
relevant capacity. Therefore, capacitism posits that Swampman possesses all the capacities that Davidson possessed 
shortly before being struck by lightning. Indeed I argue that neither the content nor the epistemic force of a mental state 
depends on the history or reliability of employing the capacities that constitutes that mental state. Since capacitism holds 
that the function of perceptual capacities is independent of the history of the subject employing those capacities, the view 
posits that Swampman not only has mental states with content, but also mental states with epistemic force.6 
A perceptual capacity has a certain function irrespective of whether it fulfills its function in any particular context of 
employment. To explain why, it is helpful to distinguish capacities from their employment. While a capacity is a kind of 
mental tool, the employment of a capacity is a mental activity. Consider Sam who possesses the perceptual capacity 
that functions to discriminate and single out red particulars. Just as Sam’s heart has the function to pump blood, but may 
fail to pump blood, so Sam may employ her capacity while failing to single out any red particular. In such a case, the 
capacity failed to fulfill its function because the target of employing the capacity is not present: no red particular was 
discriminated and singled out. 
A few clarifications are in order before we move on to developing the individuation conditions of perceptual capacities. 
First, for ƒ to be a natural function does not imply that ƒ is a biological function. While biological functions are natural 
functions, not all natural functions are biological functions. After all, a computer can have a natural function, but it does 
not have a biological function. 
Second, it is crucial that the function of a perceptual capacity is not just a matter of discriminating particulars, but also 
of singling them out. Due to this, perceiving an instance of red is distinct from perceiving an instance of blue. Both cases 
may involve discriminating red from blue, but in the former case an instance of red is singled out, while in the latter case 
an instance of blue is singled out. So the capacities employed are distinct, and the perceptual states constituted by employing 
those capacities differ. 
Third, while capacitism is compatible with functionalism, it does not commit one to functionalism. Functionalism 
individuates mental states not with regard to their internal constitution or their relation to the environment, but rather 
on the basis of their function in the cognitive system of which they are a part (e.g. Lewis 1966, Block 1978). Capacitism 
                                                      
6 Schellenberg 2013, 2017. 
 individuates mental states on the basis of mental capacities and mind-independent particulars: mental states are 
constituted by the mental capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. The function of those 
capacities is not understood in terms of the role those capacities play in the cognitive system of which they are a part. 
Thus, capacitism does not entail functionalism. There may, however, be good reasons to integrate capacitism in a 
functionalist view of the mind. 
2.1. Material discrimination 
When we perceptually discriminate α from β we discriminate an actual, mindindependent particular α to which we 
are perceptually related from a distinct actual, mind-independent particular β to which we are similarly perceptually 
related. Let’s call this kind of discrimination material discrimination. When I speak of discrimination without further 
qualification, I mean always material discrimination. Discriminating between two particulars in this sense does not 
require attending to both particulars. It requires only registering their differences. Consider Dylan who is walking 
through thick foliage. It is unclear how she could be perceptually aware of, say, a leaf without registering how it differs in 
at least one respect from its surround. More generally, it is unclear how one could be perceptually aware of a particular 
without registering how it differs in at least one respect from its surround. The basic level of employing perceptual 
capacities is to discriminate one particular from another, where this discrimination is understood as registering their 
differences.7 
Material discrimination is distinct from any notion of discrimination understood in terms of carving out possibility 
space. On such notions, to discriminate α is to discriminate α from other possible ways α could be. In particular, 
material discrimination is to be distinguished from the notion of discrimination in relevant alternative views of 
knowledge (Austin 1946, Dretske 1969, 1981, Goldman 1976), contextualism and pragmatic encroachment accounts 
(Hawthorne 2003, Stanley 2005, DeRose 2009), as well as contrastivism (Schaffer 2005). Subtleties aside, such views 
have it that to know that an object o has property F (in some circumstance), one must be able to rule out some relevant 
alternatives, that is, certain relevant situations in which o has, say, property G rather than F. On this notion of 
discrimination, to discriminate a property F that an object o instantiates is to discriminate F from relevant alternative 
ways o could be. As Pritchard puts it: 
In the perceptual case at least, to be able to rule out an alternative is to be able to make the relevant discriminations between the target 
object and the object at issue in the alternative—e.g., to be able to discriminate between goldfinches and woodpeckers. (Pritchard 
2010: 246) 
On such relevant alternative views of knowledge, discrimination is necessary for knowledge: to know one must 
discriminate the way things are from relevant other ways they might be. The notion of discrimination is a matter of modal 
appreciation.8 
Material discrimination is distinct from discriminating relevant alternatives in two ways. First, material discrimination 
is a matter of noticing differences between actual, mind-independent particulars to which one is perceptually related 
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and Julesz 1985, Malik and Perona 1990, Krummenacher and Grubert 2010, and To, Gilchrist, at al. 2011. 
8 Accepting this is compatible with holding that perceptual knowledge results from the exercise of cognitive capacities operating 
on inputs received from perception. However, in Part III, I will develop a view of perceptual knowledge that does not put any 
such intellectualist conditions on perceptual knowledge. 
 rather than appreciating relevant alternatives. Second, material discrimination need not be cognitive (and typically is 
not), while any kind of modal appreciation and modal theorizing falls squarely in the cognitive realm. It is standard to 
distinguish perception and cognition. Perception is a kind of mental faculty that we share with non-rational animals. 
While human perception might be rife with top-down effects, there is no reason to think that modal appreciation is 
constitutive of perception.8 
Material discrimination is distinct not only from appreciating relevant alternatives, but also from detecting differences 
between mental states via introspection. It has been argued that two phenomenal states M1 and M2 differ if and only if their 
subject can introspectively tell them apart (Shoemaker 1994). I am not denying that we can discriminate between 
phenomenal states in this way. We can call this introspective discrimination. The important point here is that in 
perceiving our environment, we discriminate between external, mind-independent particulars, rather than mental states 
or aspects of mental states. According to capacitism, discriminating such particulars constitutes perceptual states and 
indeed phenomenal character, and so is more basic than introspective discrimination. 
 
3. The Individuation Condition 
Perceptual capacities are individuated by the external, mind-independent particulars that they function to single out. 
Individuation Condition:  A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind-independent particulars 
α1, α2, α3, . . . αn that the perceptual capacity functions to single out. 
Given that perceptual capacities are individuated externally, the perceptual capacity that functions to single out 
instances of red differs from the perceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of scarlet or vermilion. There 
will be a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out instances of red, a distinct perceptual capacity to discriminate 
and single out instances of scarlet, and yet another perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out instances of 
vermilion. So perceptual capacities can be more or less fine-grained and we can single out the very same particular with 
capacities that are more or less fine-grained. Suppose you see a field of flowers that are shades of red and yellow. You can 
employ your capacity to discriminate between red and yellow and thus be aware of a field of red and yellow flowers. 
Alternatively, you can employ your capacity to discriminate between crimson, scarlet, and vermilion, and between 
lemon, mustard, and ochre and thus be aware of the colors in front of you in a more fine-grained way. 
The external, mind-independent property-instances that we can perceive do not just include instances of intrinsic 
properties, such as intrinsic shapes, colors, sounds, smells, textures, and the like.9 We always perceive from a perspective. As 
a consequence, we perceive under situational features, that is, features such as the lighting conditions, color context, the 
acoustic conditions, and our location in relation to the particulars perceived. Thus, when we perceive a circular coin from 
different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin’s 
appearance changes. Likewise, when we perceive two trees of the same size located at different distances from us, there 
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 is a respect in which they look the same size, but also a respect in which they appear different (Peacocke 1983). Perception 
has both an invariant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective— and a variant aspect—an aspect 
that changes depending on one’s perspective. How should we account for the variant aspect of perception? 
One option is to understand the variant aspect in terms of situation-dependent properties. 10  A situation-
dependent property is an external, mind-independent property that is determined by an intrinsic property and 
relevant situational features (e.g. the perceiver’s location relative to the perceived intrinsic property, the lighting 
conditions, acoustic conditions etc.). Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically 
dependent on intrinsic properties and situational features. Any perceiver occupying the same location would, ceteris 
paribus, be presented with the same situation-dependent property. As with intrinsic properties, perceivers differ, 
however, with regard to which situation-dependent properties are perceptually available to them and they differ in 
how they represent and are aware of situationdependent properties. If this is right, then the external, mind-independent 
propertyinstances that we can perceive include situation-dependent properties, in addition to intrinsic properties. 
The boundaries of the set of particulars that a capacity functions to single out is set by the world. It is not set by what a 
perceiver takes her perceptual capacity to function to single out. So the boundaries of my capacity to discriminate and single 
out squares is set by squares not by what I take to be squares. If in perception I take something to be a square that is not in 
fact a square, I employ my perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out squares baselessly, while failing to single out a 
square. Thus I presuppose a strong form of realism. 
As we have seen, perceptual capacities are with regard to their individuation conditions analyzed in terms of mere 
relations to the world and so without any appeal to mental entities, be they, states, capacities, or events. In this respect, 
capacitism builds on causal views of mental states (Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975, Burge 1979, Devitt 1981). However, as I will 
argue shortly, with regard to their possession conditions the situation is more complex: the possession of at least some 
perceptual capacities requires possessing other perceptual capacities. 
4. The Possession Condition 
Perceptual capacities cannot be analyzed independently of analyzing their possession conditions. To possess a perceptual 
capacity is to be in a position to discriminate and single out the external, mind-independent particulars that the capacity 
functions to single out when perceptually related to such particulars and some further conditions hold. So if we possess 
such a capacity, then—assuming no exotic case obtains—the following counterfactual holds: if we were perceptually 
related to a particular that the capacity functions to single out, then we would be in a position to discriminate and single 
out that particular. More precisely: 
Possession Condition: A subject S possesses a perceptual capacity Cα if and only if the following 
counterfactual is true of S: S would be in a position to discriminate and 
single out a particular α1, where α1 is any particular of the type that Cα 
functions to discriminate and single out, if S were perceptually related to α1, 
(i) assuming S is perceptually capable (awake, alert, etc.), 
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 (ii) assuming no finking, masking, or other exotic case obtains, and (iii) 
where S being perceptually related to α1 means that (a) the situational 
features are such that α1 is perceivable by S (good lighting conditions 
etc.), (b) S has the relevant sensory apparatus that allows her to gain 
information about α1, and (c) S is spatially and temporally related to α1 such 
that S is in a position to gain information about α1 via her sensory apparatus. 
The condition requires only that a subject be in a position to discriminate and single out a particular of the type that 
Cα functions to single out when perceptually related to one, and not that she in fact do so. The reason for this is that even 
if the subject is perceptually related to a relevant particular, she might for a variety of reasons fail to single out the 
particular, perhaps because she does not notice the particular due to her attention being directed elsewhere.  
It will be helpful to specify each qualification of what it is to be perceptually related to a particular. The qualification that the 
subject is perceptually capable rules out cases in which the subject is not at that particular moment able to employ her 
perceptual capacity (perhaps because she is intoxicated or sleepy), even though she is generally capable of doing so. The 
qualification that no finking, masking, or other exotic cases obtain rules out cases in which the subject mysteriously loses 
her capacity from one moment to the next. The inference from a claim about perceptual capacities to a counterfactual fails in 
such cases.11 However, all the standard ways of fixing the disposition-to-counterfactual inference can be exploited for the 
capacity-to-counterfactual inference (see Lewis 1997). Finding a formulation of the capacity-to-counterfactual inference that 
is indefeasible in light of all possible finking, masking, and similarly exotic cases would be a project of its own. Therefore, I 
will here work on the independently plausible assumption that no such exotic cases obtain. 
The first specification of what it means to be perceptually related rules out cases in which the subject is causally related 
to a relevant particular α1, but it is, for example, too dark or too noisy for her to perceive the particular. The second 
specification rules out cases in which the relevant subject does not have the sensory apparatus to perceive α1, perhaps 
because her sensory organs are damaged. The third specification rules out cases in which the subject is causally related to 
a relevant particular α1, but not in a way that allows her to gain information about α1 via her sensory organs—perhaps 
because α1 is so close to her eyes that she cannot properly make it out or so far away that she is unable to discriminate it 
from its surround. 
Successfully employing a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out particulars of a type requires being 
differentially sensitive to particulars of that type in one’s environment. However, the counterfactual analysis of 
perceptual capacities entails that one could possess a perceptual capacity despite not being able at that very moment to 
respond differentially to the relevant particulars. If one is sufficiently intoxicated, one might not be able to respond 
differentially to much at all. In such states, one nonetheless possesses perceptual capacities. Moreover, if one does not have 
the relevant sensory apparatus or one’s sensory apparatus is impaired, one cannot be perceptually related to particulars 
that the perceptual capacity functions to discriminate and single out. In those cases too, one nevertheless can possess 
perceptual capacities. One will just not be in a position to employ them while fulfilling their function without being 
appropriately connected to a sensory apparatus. In short, while successfully employing a perceptual capacity requires 
being differentially sensitive to particulars of the relevant type in one’s environment, possessing a perceptual capacity is not 
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 subject to this requirement. 
There are several close alternatives to the counterfactual analysis provided. A conditional could, for example, be 
formulated in terms of a “might” or a “could.” 
If the conditional were formulated in terms of a “might” or a “could,” the link between possessing a perceptual capacity 
and successfully employing it would be too weak to entail a constitutive relation between the perceptual capacities 
employed and the perceptual states thereby constituted.12 Therefore, it is crucial that the conditional is formulated in 
terms of a “would.” 
Now, one might wonder what the connection is between possessing specific capacities and possessing closely related 
capacities. One might wonder, for example, whether there could be a perceiver who possesses only the capacity to discriminate 
red from other colors without possessing any perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out other colors. More 
radically, can there be a perceiver who possesses only one perceptual capacity? In response, there is empirical evidence that 
possession of at least some perceptual capacities comes in clusters. For example, if one is able to discriminate angles from 
straight lines, one will also be able to discriminate curves from straight lines. And, if one possesses the capacity to 
discriminate, for example, red from blue and single out red, one will also possess the capacity to discriminate blue from red 
and single out blue.13 
4.1. Possessing a capacity vs employing a capacity 
What is the relation between possessing a capacity and employing it? It has been argued that one cannot count as 
possessing a capacity if one has never employed it successfully (Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium 2.3, 736b21–6 & 
4.1, 766a5–10).14 It has been argued, moreover, that if one employs a capacity without it fulfilling its function, then one 
does not count as possessing the capacity at that moment (Millar 2008). Aristotle attributes a view that is even more 
restrictive to the Megarians: 
There are some—such as the Megarians—who say that something is capable only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it is 
not capable. For example, someone who is not building is not capable of building, but someone who is building is capable when 
he is building; and likewise too in other cases. It is not hard to see the absurd consequences of this. (Metaphysics, Book Θ, 1046b) 
On the Megarian view, one can possess a capacity only when one is successfully employing it. 
Against all these views, I am arguing that we can possess a capacity even if we never employ it. Possessing a 
capacity is thus metaphysically more fundamental than employing a capacity: a subject cannot employ a capacity that she 
does not possess, but she can possess a capacity without ever employing it. 
Aristotle’s distinction between first and second potentiality of capacities and first and second actuality of capacities is 
helpful here (De Anima II.5, 417a22–417a30). We can distinguish between an English speaker’s innate capacity to speak a 
language (first potentiality), her capacity to speak English when she is sleeping (second potentiality), and her capacity to 
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 speak English when she is speaking English (second actuality). If one has first potentiality of a capacity one is the kind of 
being that could possess that capacity. If one has second potentiality of a capacity one possesses that capacity (Aristotle 
also calls this the first actuality of a capacity). If one manifests the second actuality of a capacity one employs the capacity 
successfully. 
A necessary condition for possessing a capacity is to be the kind of being who could possess that capacity and to meet 
some further constraint, such as being in an environment in which one has the opportunity to come to possess the 
capacity. Aristotle expresses this idea when he maintains that first potentiality is prior to second potentiality (or first 
actuality). A necessary condition for employing a capacity is to possess that capacity and to meet some further constraint, 
such as being in a suitable environment. Aristotle expresses this idea when he maintains that first actuality is prior to 
second actuality.15 
 
5. The Fallibility Condition 
So far, we have analyzed perceptual capacities in light of their function to discriminate and single out particulars in 
perception. What happens when we fail to single out what we purport to single out, such as in cases of hallucination and 
illusion? I argue that perceptual capacities are fallible in that the very same perceptual capacity can be employed in 
perception, hallucination, and illusion. 
Fallibility Condition: If a subject S employs a capacity Cα, Cα can either fulfill its function or fail to 
fulfill its function, such that there is no difference at the level of employing Cα 
but only a difference at the level of fulfilling its function. The function of Cα is 
fulfilled if by employing Cα a relevant particular is singled out. The function of 
Cα fails to be fulfilled if by employing Cα no relevant particular is singled out. 
The relevant alternative to understanding capacities as fallible is to understand them as infallible. Millar among others 
understands perceptual capacities (including recognitional capacities) in this way: 
If I had judged falsely that the plants in the plot were azaleas I would not have exercised the recognitional ability in 
question. The general point here is that the notion of the exercise of a recognitional ability is a success notion. (Millar 
2008: 333.) 
If capacities are understood as infallible, then one cannot employ a capacity if one does not succeed in fulfilling its 
function. I will not here argue against infallibilist views of capacities, but will focus rather on why we should 
understand perceptual capacities as fallible. 
By way of analogy, consider that if we possess a concept, then we can employ it even if we fail to refer. After all, if we say 
“That’s a horse,” pointing to where in fact there is no horse, we are arguably using the very same concept horse that we would 
use if we were successfully pointing at a horse. The difference between the former and the latter case is simply that in the 
former, but not the latter, we fail to refer. The failure occurs at the level of reference. There is no failure at the level of 
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 employing the concept. If that is right, then there is no reason to think that the two cases differ with regard to employing the 
concept horse. 
The very same thing can be said of perceptual capacities. If we possess a perceptual capacity, then we can employ it 
even if we are not accurately perceiving. One could be prompted to employ a perceptual capacity due to non-standard 
circumstances: unusual brain stimulations or misleading distal inputs, for example. Given that capacities are 
determined by functional relations between the perceiver and her environment and not by individual token responses, 
we can employ a capacity even if a relevant particular is not present. If this is right, then like concepts, perceptual 
capacities are fallible. 
If we employ a concept, but fail to refer, the concept employed remains empty. Analogously, if we employ a 
perceptual capacity, but fail to single out a particular, the capacity is employed baselessly. It is employed baselessly in the 
sense that the usual target of discrimination and selection—an external, mind-independent particular— is absent. 
Let’s consider some examples. In the paradigmatic case of hallucination, it seems to us that there is an object where in 
fact there is no such object. Consider Kim when she hallucinates a white cup. She employs her capacity to discriminate 
and single out an object of a certain type. Moreover, she employs her capacity to discriminate and single out white from 
other colors along with capacities to single out various other propertyinstances: luminance, shapes, textures, and so on. 
Since she is hallucinating and so not perceptually related to a white cup, all these capacities are employed baselessly. 
In the paradigmatic case of illusion, it seems to us that an object has a property that it does not in fact instantiate. A 
subject who is suffering an illusion is not perceptually related to at least one particular that she purports to single out. Say 
she sees an object that instantiates property π, but given misleading circumstances, it seems to her (falsely) to be instantiating 
property ρ. In such a case, she employs her capacity to discriminate and single out an instance of ρ. But given that there is no 
ρ-instance present, she employs that capacity while failing to single out any particular. In the typical case, she will be 
employing several other capacities successfully. But insofar as she is suffering an illusion, she employs at least one 
capacity baselessly. 
Now, in perception the particulars between which we discriminate are mindindependent particulars in our 
environment. This invites the question: what do we discriminate between when we employ perceptual capacities 
baselessly? In response: when we employ a capacity baselessly, we are not discriminating any mind-independent particulars. 
Indeed, we are not discriminating any particulars. We are employing a mental tool without that mental tool fulfilling 
its function. The important point for present purposes is that the fact that the mental tool is not fulfilling its function 
does not imply that we are not employing the mental tool. 
5.1. The dependence of perceptual capacities on mind-independent particulars 
I have argued that while perceptual capacities are individuated by the particulars they function to single out, they can 
nonetheless be employed baselessly. This invites the question of whether perceptual capacities are dependent on the 
particulars they function to single out.16 There are at least three different ways of understanding this question, each of 
which requires its own response. 
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 One way of understanding it is as a question about possessing capacities. Could a subject possess a perceptual 
capacity, even though she has never been perceptually related to a particular of the kind that the capacity functions to 
single out? In response: yes. After all, the capacity could be innate. The perceiver may have been unlucky and never been 
perceptually related to a relevant particular. So despite possessing the capacity, the perceiver will never have had a 
chance to employ her capacity to successfully single out a relevant particular. 
A second way of understanding the question is as a question about employing capacities. Could a perceptual capacity 
be employed even if the relevant particular is not present? In response: yes. As noted, a perceptual capacity could be 
employed in the absence of any relevant particular. This occurs in cases of hallucination and illusion. 
A third way of understanding the question is as an existence question. Could a perceptual capacity exist that 
functions to single out a kind of particular that does not exist and has never existed? In response: no. Any perceptual 
capacities must be grounded in perception in the sense that any perceptual capacity must have been employed 
successfully by someone, somewhere. If that is right, then a perceptual capacity could not exist if no particular of the kind 
exists that the capacity functions to single out.17 
In sum, while perceptual capacities are individuated by the particulars they function to single out, they are dependent on 
particulars only in the following sense: a perceptual capacity could not exist if no particular that it functions to discriminate 
and single out exists or ever has existed. 
6. The Asymmetry Condition 
While perceptual capacities are fallible and employable in perception, illusion, and hallucination alike, there is an 
asymmetry between employing a capacity in perception and employing that same capacity in hallucination or illusion. 
Asymmetry Condition:  The employment of a perceptual capacity Cα in cases in which Cα fulfills 
its function is metaphysically more basic than the employment of Cα in 
cases in which Cα fails to fulfill its function. 
The reason for this asymmetry is that it is the function of a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single outparticulars. 
It is notits function to fail to single outparticulars. This is the case even if a perceptual capacity is more often than not 
employed unsuccessfully. As a consequence, there is both an explanatory and a metaphysical primacy of the employment 
of a perceptual capacity in perception over its employment in hallucination or illusion. 
There is an explanatory primacy of employing a perceptual capacity in perception over its employment in 
hallucination or illusion since one can give an analysis of the capacity employed in hallucination or illusion only by 
appealing to its role in perception. Consider again Kim when she suffers a hallucination as of a white cup on a desk. Even 
though she fails to single out anything white, she is in a phenomenal state that is as of an instance of white in virtue of 
employing the capacity to discriminate and single out white from other colors. She would single out an instance of white 
were she perceptually related to a white cup—assuming again that no finking, masking, or other exotic case obtains. After 
all, she is employing a perceptual capacity the very function of which is to differentiate white from other colors and to 
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 single out white in her environment. In this sense, we need to refer to what Kim would discriminate between and what 
she would single out in perception to explain the role of the capacities she employs in hallucination. 
Licensing this explanatory primacy, there is a metaphysical primacy of employing a perceptual capacity in perception over 
its employment in hallucination or illusion. There is such a metaphysical primacy since a perceptual capacity functions to 
do what it does in perception, namely discriminate and single out particulars. It does not function to do what it does in 
hallucination or illusion, namely fail to discriminate and single out the particular that one purports to single out. On one 
understanding of metaphysical primacy, we can associate things with natures and see if the nature of one thing makes 
reference to another. If so, the latter will be said to be relatively primary and the former secondary. We can then construct 
chains so that if the nature of A makes reference to B, and the nature of B makes reference to C, then C will be primary, B 
secondary, and A tertiary. According to capacitism, in hallucination and illusion the subject employs her perceptual 
capacities while failing to fulfill their function, and these capacities are by their nature defined in terms of success in the 
perceptual case. Thus, the perceptual case is relatively primary and the hallucination and illusion cases are secondary. 
For the reasons discussed under the fallibility condition, the asymmetry condition does not imply that we must have 
successfully used a perceptual capacity in the past to employ that capacity in hallucination.18 
Another way of expressing the idea motivating the asymmetry condition is as follows: the fact that we can employ 
capacities while failing to single out particulars depends on the fact that we can employ such capacities to single out 
particulars. This idea is analogous to the idea that misrepresentation depends on representation. Indeed, if employing 
perceptual capacities yields representational content, the two ideas go hand in hand.18 
The proposed asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual capacities differs in significant ways from Fodor’s 
asymmetrical causal dependence account of mental representation (Fodor 1987, 1990). According to Fodor, a mental state 
represents properties or objects only if it is reliably tokened by the presence of the relevant properties or objects. A 
mental symbol represents, say, pigs only if it is reliably tokened by pigs. So reliability is a necessary condition for Fodor’s 
account: symbols of cognitive systems represent because of regularities between those cognitive systems and 
environments. Such regularities also explain what it is for such symbols to represent in the first place. Like all tracking 
theories (Dretske 1981, Millikan 1984), Fodor’s account faces indeterminacy problems. It fails to ground determinate 
content, which is required not just for avoiding Quinean indeterminacy problems (e.g. undetached pig parts, pig timeslices), 
but also to allow for the possibility of misrepresentation (and thus for avoiding the “disjunction” problem) and for ruling 
out proximal contents (e.g. piggy retinal patterns). Fodor (1990) addresses these indeterminacy problems by adding 
several conditions to his original account. He stipulates (i) that the mental symbol must be actually caused (not just that 
it would be caused) by the object or property (i.e. by pigs), and (ii) that the mental symbol has actually been caused by the 
wrong kinds of objects or properties (i.e. non-pigs), and thus that misrepresentation is not simply possible but that it has 
actually occurred. Adding these extra conditions, however, undermines the power of the account to explain mental 
content. 
The key problem with accounts of mental content that depend on reliability conditions is the following: if a mental 
state M reliably represents P (e.g. pig), then M will also reliably represent the disjunction P v Q (e.g. pig or a bull terrier; pig 
or undetached pig part). After all, P and P v Q will be co-instantiated. The reliability relation does not cut finely enough to 
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 privilege P over the alternatives. In contrast to Fodor’s asymmetrical causal dependence account, capacitism does not face 
these problems since it does not depend on the reliability of perceptual capacities. 
7. The Repeatability Condition 
A perceptual capacity must be repeatable. More precisely: 
Repeatability Condition:  A necessary condition for Cα to be a perceptual capacity is that Cα is 
repeatable. 
The repeatability condition implies that it must be possible to employ Cα in at least two distinct contexts for Cα to be a 
perceptual capacity. Now it might be that one possesses a perceptual capacity that one has—for whatever reason—
employed only once, or indeed never. The requirement is not that one has in fact employed a perceptual capacity more 
than once, but that it is possible to employ that capacity in at least two distinct contexts. The contexts may differ in at least 
the following five ways. 
One way is with regard to the particulars singled out. In one context, the perceptual capacity Cα can be employed to 
discriminate and single out the particular α1; in another it can be employed to discriminate and single out the particular 
α2, where α1 and α2 are numerically distinct particulars each of which Cα functions to discriminate and single out. 
Second, the contexts could differ with regard to whether the perceptual capacity is employed while fulfilling its 
function, or employed while failing to fulfill its function. In one context, a perceptual capacity Cα can be employed while 
succeeding in singling out the particular α1; in another it can be employed while failing to single out any particular. 
Third, the contexts could differ with regard to the situational features that determine the conditions under which a 
particular is perceived—features such as lighting conditions, acoustic conditions, or the angle and distance from which 
the particular is perceived. The perceptual capacity Cα can be employed to discriminate and single out the particular α1 
under distinct situational features.19 
Fourth, the contexts could differ temporally. The perceptual capacity Cα can be employed to discriminate and single 
out the particular α1 at time t1 and at time t2. 
Fifth, the contexts could differ spatially. The perceptual capacity Cα can be employed to discriminate and single out the 
particular α1 at location L1 and at location L2. 
In each of these five ways in which the contexts could differ, the same perceptual capacity Cα can be employed in two 
distinct contexts. As these examples of distinct contexts show, the bar for a perceptual capacity to be repeatable is low. 
Now, it may be that at least some particulars are correlated with a unique perceptual capacity. This is plausible if one 
allows that perceptual capacities are quite high-level. Let’s assume that Robin possesses a perceptual capacity to 
discriminate and single out his mother. This perceptual capacity will be individuated by exactly one particular in the 
world. Nonetheless, the perceptual capacity is repeatable. After all, Robin can employ his capacity to single out his 
mother today and also tomorrow. 
Capacitism is neutral on whether perceptual capacities function to single out only low-level properties such as colors, 
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 shapes, sounds, smells, and the like, or whether there are perceptual capacities that function to single out individual people, 
skyscrapers, pine trees as such. Nothing in the account presented in this book hinges on how the debate on whether 
perception represents only low-level properties or also high-level properties is resolved. 
 
8. The Physical Base and Informational Base of Perceptual Capacities 
We can analyze perceptual states at three distinct levels: 
I. the mental state level 
II. the information-processing, computational level 
III. the physical, neural level. 
Employing perceptual capacities lies at the mental state level.20 Computational states, events, and processes (as well as 
any other subpersonal functional states, events, and processes) that support mental states lie at the information-
processing level. Neural networks and neural activity (as well as other biological or mechanical structures, states, 
events, and processes) in which the other two levels are realized lie at the physical level. 
What are the computational and neural underpinnings of employing perceptual capacities? What is the relation 
between mental states brought about by employing perceptual capacities and the non-mental states, events, and 
processes in virtue of which they obtain? Any employment of a perceptual capacity has a physical base. 
Physical Base Condition:  If a subject S is employing a perceptual capacity Cα, then there is a physical 
base of employing Cα that is constituted by physical states, events, and processes 
(such as the neural activity) of S. 
The physical base condition allows for multiple realizability. So the fact that employing perceptual capacities has a physical 
base does not imply an identity relation between employing a perceptual capacity and its physical base. Nor does it imply 
that there is an identity relation between the mental states constituted by employing perceptual capacities and the 
physical base of their employment.21 
Any employment of a perceptual capacity has not only a physical base, but also an informational base. 
Informational Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual capacity Cα, then there is an 
informational base of employing Cα that is constituted by the subpersonal 
psychological mechanism (information processing, computations, and other 
subpersonal functional states, events, and processes) of S. 
There are complex relations between the information-processing level and the physical level. After all, neural networks 
encode information. One central question is what the relation is (if any) between information-processing modularity 
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 and neural modularity—assuming here standardly, though not uncontroversially, that there are information-processing 
modules (Barrett and Kurzban 2006, Evans and Frankish 2009). Information-processing modules are informationally 
encapsulated, functionally specialized computational mechanisms that are dedicated to perceptual or cognitive tasks: 
specific perceptual discrimination, biological classification, face recognition, to give just a few examples (Fodor 1983, 
Coltheart 1999, Barrett and Kurzban 2006, Carruthers 2006). Neural modularity is a claim about the relation between 
informationprocessing modules and physical neural networks, namely that there is a one-to-one mapping between 
information-processing modules and locations of neural activity. 
It has been argued that information-processing modules have localized neural bases and that evidence of neural 
modularity, and more specifically of neuroanatomical localization, is required to support claims of information-
processing modularity.22 There is, however, compelling evidence that information-processing modularity does not entail 
physical neural modularity.23 After all, information-processing modules are functionally characterized and could change 
over time—in response, for example, to damage (Segal 1996). So while at any given time there must be some neural 
structure (or analogous physical structure) that realizes each module’s processing mechanism and establishes its 
informational connections with other subsystems, these structures could change. Furthermore, distinct information-
processing modules might be grounded in the same neural structures. As with any complex biological or informational 
systems, there may be considerable sharing of physical parts between informationprocessing modules (Carruthers 2006). 
Moreover, given the flexibility of neural networks and physical structures more generally, any commitment to physical 
modularity should be rejected (Lloyd 2011). Thus, there is good evidence that informationprocessing modules need not 
have localized neural bases and that neuroanatomical localization is not required to support claims of information-
processing modularity (Frankish 2011). And indeed we can accept the physical base condition on the employment of 
perceptual capacities without endorsing any one-to-one mapping between information-processing modules and 
locations of neural activity. 
What about the relation between the mental state level and the informationprocessing level? The view that perceptual 
states are constituted by employing perceptual capacities fits neatly with computationalism, according to which personal-
level mental states are grounded in computational states. Now, some reductive versions of computationalism have it that 
mental states are fully analyzable in computational terms. According to such views, personal-level mental states can be 
deduced from computational states, events, and processes: mental states simply are computational states at a certain stage 
of information processing. 
We can accept that mental states are grounded in computational states, however, without endorsing such a reductive 
view. After all, states, events, and processes on the mental level can be grounded in states, events, and processes on the 
computational level even if no identity relations hold between the two levels. Accepting a grounding relation does not 
entail that personal-level mental states can be identified with or reduced to computational states, events, and processes. 
Moreover, states, events, and processes on the computational level can cause states, events, and processes on the mental 
level even if no identity relations hold between the two levels. In short, mental states, events, and processes can be 
grounded in, explained in terms of, or obtain in virtue of computational states, events, and processes, without any 
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 identity relations holding between the two levels. 
This approach allows us to accept the existence of states, events, and processes on both levels and to understand vision 
science, and the cognitive sciences more generally, as investigating the metaphysical and explanatory dependencies 
between the two levels. On this approach, the focus is not on whether there are identity relations between states, events, 
and processes on the two levels, but rather on the causal and grounding relations between the two (Strevens 2004, Craver 
2007, Godfrey-Smith 2008, Silva and Bickle 2009, Craver and Darden 2013). This allows us to acknowledge that an account 
of information processing is a necessary element of any complete account of perception, while also acknowledging that 
central questions, such as the nature and source of perceptual consciousness and the epistemic force of perceptual states, 
cannot be adequately addressed solely at the computational level. 
As I have argued, employing perceptual capacities is grounded in subpersonal computational mechanisms and 
physical neural networks that encode information. Thus, capacitism entails that perceptual states can be scientifically 
explained in terms of informational and physical states, events, and processes, without thereby reducing perceptual states 
to those non-mental features. In this way, capacitism posits that perceptual states are genuinely mental, yet can 
nonetheless be the object of scientific inquiry.24 
 
9. The Generality of Perceptual Capacities 
A perceptual capacity is general in that it can be employed to single out any particular of the type that the capacity 
functions to discriminate and single out. In the typical case, no specific particular needs to be singled out in any specific 
employment of a perceptual capacity.25 Any particular will do, as long as it falls under the type of particulars that the 
capacity functions to discriminate and single out. For example, the perceptual capacity Csquare canbe employed to discriminate 
and single outany perceivable square object. In this sense, it is semantically general in much the way as the concept square 
is semantically general. Semantic generality should be distinguished from syntactic generality. While perceptual capacities 
are semantically general, they are syntactically singular: they function to single out particulars in the environment—not 
general kinds or universals. In this respect, they are akin to singular terms, such as demonstratives and indexicals. Not 
only are perceptual capacities syntactically singular, the perceptual states they yield are syntactically singular as well. 
9.1. Perceptual capacities and modes of presentation 
By employing a perceptual capacity in perception, we single out a particular in a certain way. Let’s say we are 
perceptually related to a triangle. We can single it out via its three-sidedness, or via its three-corneredness. When we 
single it out via its three-sidedness we employ a different capacity than when we single it out via its three-corneredness. 
Similarly, when we hear a cello in the midst of the cacophony of an orchestra, we can single it out in virtue of its rich 
timbre or its reverberating sound. When we see a ruby-red gemstone, we can single it out in virtue of it being red or in 
virtue of it being ruby-red.  
As I have argued elsewhere, employing perceptual capacities constitutes perceptual content and this content is 
                                                      
24 For helpful discussions of computational accounts of perception, see Egan 1992 and Cohen 2010. 
25 Exceptions are perceptual capacities that function to single out one unique particular, such as Robin’s perceptual capacity 
to single out his mother. 
 structured by singular modes of presentation.26 Employing perceptual capacities parallels Fregean modes of presentation 
both with regard to being ways of singling out particulars and with regard to the fact that any particular can be singled 
out by employing a range of different perceptual capacities.  
The idea that content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities by means of which we (purport to) single out 
particulars is analogous to the Fregean idea that modes of presentation are a way of grasping or referring to particulars. 
A mode of presentation is the specific way in which a subject refers to a particular.  
While Frege introduces the distinction between sense and reference with a perceptual case, he does not develop the 
notion for perceptual content. His focus was never on lowly mental faculties like perception. Nonetheless, we can apply 
his view of modes of presentation to the case of perception. Applied to that case, the idea is that a mode of presentation 
is the specific way in which a subject singles out a perceived particular. Insofar as perceptual capacities are ways of 
singling out particulars, they can be understood as the mental counterpart of Fregean modes of presentation: as a mode 
of presentation is a way of referring to an object, employing a perceptual capacity is a way of singling out a particular. 
Moreover, just as there is a many– one relation between senses and references, there is a many–one relation between 
perceptual capacities and particulars. And while a mode of presentation is a component of a thought or a proposition, a 
perceptual capacity is a mental tool. According to Frege, concepts are mappings from objects onto truth-values (Frege 
1879). Similarly, perceptual capacities are mappings from particulars onto accuracy conditions. Not only do perceptual 
capacities parallel modes of presentation in their role of singling out particulars, insofar as employing perceptual 
capacities constitutes perceptual states, they have a certain cognitive significance. So like Fregean modes of 
presentations, perceptual capacities play the dual role of having a cognitive significance and being a means of singling 
out particulars. 
One key motivation for introducing perceptual capacities and modes of presentation is to capture a fineness of grain 
in content that reference to mind-independent particulars alone could not achieve. Acknowledging that particulars are 
always singled out via employing perceptual capacities and grasped under modes of presentations makes room for the 
fact that any mind-independent particular can be represented in different ways. So any particular can be singled out via 
employing distinct perceptual capacities and any particular can be grasped under different modes of presentation. On a 
Russellian understanding, alternative possible modes of presentation can be expressed only insofar as one may have 
different cognitive attitudes to the same content. The way in which one perceives or thinks of the object is not expressed 
in the content proper. On the Fregean approach every particular perceived will be represented under a mode of 
presentation.  
Due to this, the Fregean view avoids counterexamples to Russellian representational views.27 Consider a case in 
which you are looking at a page of graph paper and so a page of symmetrically arranged tiles. You can see the tiles as 
being grouped. There are a number of ways the tiles can be grouped depending on which tiles are seen to be more 
prominent. Now, let’s say that at time t1 you see one set of tiles as prominent and at time t2 you see another set of tiles 
as prominent ceteris paribus. In such a case, there is no difference in the environment: the tiles perceived are exactly the 
same at t1 and t2. The only difference is how the mind groups the tiles.28 Since there is no change in the environment to 
which you are perceptually related, it is not clear how a Russellian would account for the change in representational 
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 content. A Fregean has no problem dealing with such a case. A Fregean will say that you represent the tiles under 
different modes of presentation at t1 and t2.  
A more general advantage of the Fregean approach is that it accounts for the fact that thought is fundamentally 
perspectival. Applied to perception, it accounts for the fact that perception is fundamentally perspectival—perspectival 
not only in that we perceive from a location and so in an egocentric frame of reference, but also in that we always 
perceive particulars under specific conditions (location, lighting conditions, accoustic conditions) with a specific set of 
perceptual capacities. There is always a way in which we discriminate and single out particulars in our environment. 
Consider Sasha who hears jazz for the first time. When listening to John Surman’s recording of Doxology for the first 
time, she will not discern much. As she becomes an expert, she will discern significantly more when listening to the 
very same recording. One explanation is that she develops more fine-grained perceptual capacities that allow her, for 
example, to discriminate between the sound of the trumpet and the sound of the piano even when they are playing at the 
same time and that allow her to hear differences between chords. More radically, we can say that we cannot perceive a 
particular in our environment without perceiving it from our location with our specific perceptual capacities.29 In this 
sense, we cannot perceive without being constrained by our perspective. The Fregean approach acknowledges this. 
There are two standard ways of thinking about Fregean modes of presentation. If one focuses on the role of modes 
of presentation as accounting for cognitive significance, then it is natural to think of them as de dicto. A de dicto mode 
of presentation is general in that it can be the very same regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing subject is 
perceptually related to. If, by contrast, one focuses on the role of modes of presentation as a way of referring to a 
particular, then it is natural to think of them as de re. A de re mode of presentation is singular in that what particular (if 
any) the subject is perceptually related to has repercussions for the token content.  
A de dicto mode of presentation lays down a condition that something must satisfy to be the particular determined 
by the content. Chalmers, among others, understands Fregean senses in this way: ‘‘Fregean content is supposed to be a 
sort of phenomenal content, such that, necessarily, an experience with the same phenomenal character has the same 
Fregean content’’ (2006: 99, see also Thompson 2009). A de dicto mode of presentation constitutes a way of 
representing mind-independent particulars irrespective of whether the relevant particulars are present. If the content of 
experiential states were constituted by de dicto modes of presentation, then the content of a perception, a hallucination, 
or an illusion with the same phenomenal character would be 
 
 (ep,h, i) <MOPdo, MOPdF> 
 
where MOPdo is a de dicto mode of presentation of an object and MOPdF is a de dicto mode of presentation of a 
property. Such an account of perceptual content implies a two-stage view of determining reference: first, we represent a 
general content, and in a second step, we refer to mind-independent particulars based on this content.30 Representing a 
de dicto mode of presentation is, on this view, independent of the second step, in which a particular may be determined. 
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does not distinguish between de dicto and de re modes of presentation, and as a consequence sees the problem 
articulated in the main text as a problem for any Fregean view tout court. As I will show, it is only a problem for a 
view on which Fregean senses are de dicto rather than de re.  
 Such a two-stage view faces the problem of how the content grounds the ability to refer to external particulars. Insofar 
as a de dicto mode of presentation can be the very same regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing subject is 
perceptually related to, this way of thinking about content amounts to a version of austere representationalism and faces 
all the difficulties of that view. Any view on which perceptual content is constituted by de dicto modes of presentation 
fails to satisfy the particularity desideratum for the same reasons that austere representationalism does. 
 This problem is avoided if perceptual content is analyzed as constituted by de re rather than de dicto modes of 
presentation. Understanding modes of presentation as de re is motivated by recognizing that modes of presentation play 
a dual role: they have a cognitive significance, and they single out or refer to mind-independent particulars. 
Understanding perceptual content as constituted by de re modes of presentation recognizes that representing a particular 
is not independent of singling out the particular that is the referent of the sense. By contrast to de dicto modes of 
presentation, de re modes of presentation are singular in the good case.  
 Now, on one way of understanding de re modes of presentation, a subject can have a contentful experience only 
if she is (perceptually) related to the very particular that she purports to single out. This view is a version of content 
disjunctivism.31 One problem is that the cognitive significance and the action-guiding role of experiential content is 
downplayed. When a subject hallucinates, the way things seem to her plays a certain cognitive role. If it seems to her 
that she is perceptually related to a white cup, she may, for example, reach out and try to pick it up. If one denies that 
hallucinations have representational content, this cannot be explained. It is not clear how the mere illusion of content 
could motivate the subject to act. Consider Harman’s example of Ponce de Leon who was searching Florida for the 
fountain of youth (Harman 1990). The fountain of youth does not exist, yet Ponce de Leon was looking for something 
particular. As Harman argues convincingly, he was not looking for a mental object. He was looking for a mind-
independent object that, as it so happened, unbeknownst to him, did not exist. A second problem—and the problem 
most salient for present purposes—is that, insofar as content disjunctivists hold that hallucinations do not represent, 
they leave unclear what explains the phenomenal character of hallucinations. So it is not clear how content 
disjunctivists satisfy the phenomenal sameness desideratum. While content disjunctivists acknowledge that a 
hallucination could seemingly have the same phenomenal character as a perception, they do little if anything to explain 
this phenomenon.  
 The problems of disjunctivism are avoided if perceptual content is not understood as radically object-
dependent. That would allow that hallucinations can have at least some kind of content. One way to develop such a 
view is to argue that the content of a hallucination involves a gap that in the case of a perception is filled by a particular.  
 Recall that in Section 1, we distinguished between three levels at which to analyze mental states. The first level 
of analysis pertains to the function of the mental capacity. The second level of analysis pertains to the mental capacity 
employed, irrespective of the context in which it is employed. The third level of analysis pertains to the mental capacity 
employed, taking into account the context in which it is employed. Applied to the notion of perceptual content, we can 
say that the second level of analysis pertains to the content type of a mental state, while the third level of analysis 
pertains to the token content of a mental state. The content type and the token content are both constituted by capacities 
that have a certain function. So the first level of analysis explains how the content type and the token content are 
connected beyond the one being a token of the other.  
                                                      
31 For a defense of such a view, see Evans 1982 and McDowell 1984.  
  Harnessing this distinction, we can say that there is a content type that is constituted by the perceptual 
capacities employed. Consider the case in which a subject, let’s call her Miriam, employs two perceptual capacities, one 
that functions to single α particulars and one that functions to single out π particulars. Let’s say the a particulars are 
cups α1 and the π particulars are instances white. In such a case the content type of the perceptual state brought about by 
employing these two capacities will be:  
 
  (contentType) <MOPrα[___], MOPrπ[___]> 
 
where MOPrα[___] is a content type that is constituted by employing the perceptual capacity Cα that functions to single 
out particulars α1, α2, α3, … αn; and MOPrπ[___] is a content type that is constituted by employing the perceptual 
capacity Cπ that functions to single out particulars π1, π2, π3, … πn. If in employing the perceptual capacity Cα the 
particulars α1 is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual state will be MOPrα(α1). If in employing the 
perceptual capacity Cα the particulars α2 is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual state will be MOPrα(α2). 
If in employing the perceptual capacity Cα no particular is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual state will 
be MOPrα(__). So the content type MOPrπ[___] can be tokened by MOPrα(α1), MOPrα(α2), MOPrα(__). 
 Let’s say Miriam sees a white cup and so singles out α1 by employing Cα and π1 by employing Cπ. In this case, 
the token content of her perceptual state will be  
 
  (contente1) <MOPrα(α1), MOPrπ(π1)> 
 
where MOPrrα(α1) is a singular mode of presentation of the cup α1 that is the product of employing a perceptual 
capacity that functions to single out the kind of object under which α1 falls. So “α1” is functioning as the name of an 
object. “MOPrrα” is a functional expression that expresses a function from objects to singular modes of presentation. 
MOPrπ(π1) is a singular mode of presentation of the property-instance π1 that is the product of employing a perceptual 
capacity that functions to single out instances of the property under which π1 falls. So while MOPrα(α1) is a de re mode 
of presentation of the object α1, MOPrπ(π1) is a de re mode of presentation of the property-instance π1. 
Now let’s say that Miriam hallucinates a white cup. In this case, the token content of her hallucinatory state will be 
 
  (contenth) <MOPrα(__), MOPrπ(__)> 
 
where MOPrα(__) specifies the kind of object that would have to be present for the experience to be accurate and 
MOPrπ(__) specifies the properties that this object would instantiate were the experience a perception rather than a 
hallucination. More specifically, MOPrα(__) is a gappy mode of presentation that is the product of employing a 
perceptual capacity that functions to single out objects of the kind that the hallucinating subject purports to single out 
while failing to single out any such object. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience at a (seeming) 
particular object. MOPrπ(__) is a gappy mode of presentation that is the product of employing a perceptual capacity that 
functions to single out property-instances of the kind that the hallucinating subject purports to single out while failing to 
single out any such property-instance. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience at a property-
 instance. In short, MOPrα(__) is a gappy, object-related mode of presentation and MOPrπ(__) is a gappy, property-
related mode of presentation. So for a perceptual capacity to be employed baselessly amounts to the ensuing token 
content being gappy. There is nothing metaphysically spooky about gaps. The gap simply marks the failure to single out 
a particular. Both Miriam’s hallucinatory state and her perceptual state are characterized by the content type: 
(contentType) <MOPrα[___], MOPrπ[___]>.32 
9.2. Perceptual capacities, concepts, and nonconceptual content 
A perceptual capacity can be understood either as a conceptual or a nonconceptual capacity. Which stance one takes 
will depend largely on how one understands the nature of concepts and their possession conditions. Depending on how 
concepts are understood it is more or less plausible to think of perceptual content as conceptually structured. For this 
reason, the debate over whether perceptual content is conceptual or nonconceptual is almost entirely terminological. One 
of the advantages of analyzing perceptual states (and, as I will argue, perceptual content) as constituted by employing 
perceptual capacities is that it allows us to sidestep the issue of whether perceptual content is conceptual or 
nonconceptual.33 
Concepts have been understood in terms of mental representations, stereotypes, functional roles, and inferential roles, 
tonamejustafewstandardviews. Nonconceptual content has been understood in terms of image-like or map-like 
representations, as constituted by employing nonconceptual, perceptual capacities, or in terms of the idea that we represent 
naked properties and objects. 
If concept possession requires the ability to draw inferences, then it is wildly implausible that the capacities 
employed in perception are conceptual capacities.34 After all, perception is a low-level mental faculty that we share with 
animals that have no inferential capacities. This implies that, if concept possession requires the ability to draw inferences, 
then it cannot be the case that all perceptual capacities are conceptual capacities. If, on the other hand, it is held that all 
perceivers possess concepts—even perceivers that have no inferential abilities or any other such high-level cognitive 
abilities—then it is more plausible that perceptual capacities are conceptual capacities. On such a view of concepts, the 
requirements for concept possession are cognitively so minimal that it becomes unproblematic to say that a honeybee 
possesses concepts and hence unproblematic to say that perceptual capacities are conceptual. 
While the debate on whether perceptual content is conceptual or nonconceptual is almost entirely terminological, 
there are elements of the debate that are not terminological. Focusing on those elements, I argue that perceptual content is 
nonconceptual. The key motivations are to accommodate the fact that at least some aspects of perceptual content can be 
image-like or map-like, and moreover to account for the richness and fineness of grain of perceptual experience.35 
If perceptual content is constituted by employing such nonconceptual capacities, then perceptual content is 
nonconceptual. The thesis that perceptual content is constituted by employing perceptual nonconceptual capacities gives a 
substantive analysis of the nonconceptual content of perception. 
                                                      
32 Schellenberg 2018b. 
33 For discussion of nonconceptual content, see Peacocke 1998, Heck 2000, and Speaks 2005. For recent arguments for the 
idea that perceptual content is conceptually structured, see Glüer-Pagin 2009 and Bengson et al. 2011. 
34 For a view on which possessing concepts requires inferential capacities, see Brandom 1994. 
35 The key arguments in this book can, however, be accepted if perceptual capacities are understood as conceptual rather 
than as nonconceptual capacities. 
 The thesis that perceptual content is nonconceptual is supported by the fact that on standard views of concepts, 
perceptual experience is richer and more fine-grained than our concepts. For example, the shades of color a perceiver is 
able to discriminate in perception are typically significantly more fine-grained than her color concepts. If that is right (and 
on most notions of concepts it is), then richness and fineness of grain 
of perceptual experience supports the thesis that perceptual content is nonconceptual.30 Additional evidence is provided by 
the fact that non-rational animals perceive. If nonrational animals do not possess concepts, then perceptual capacities cannot 
necessarily be conceptual. As mentioned, however, whether this additional evidence has any force depends on the notion of 
concept with which one is operating. 
The conceptualist might object that if singular thoughts or perceptual beliefs inherit their content from perception, then 
perceptual content must have the same structure as the content of belief. If that is right, then perceptual content must be 
conceptual rather than nonconceptual. In response, the nonconceptualist can say that such beliefs can be based on 
perception without their content being exactly like perceptual content. After all, the fact that perceptual beliefs are based 
on perception does not imply that perceptual content is conceptual. While it is plausible that at least some elements of 
perceptual content are similar to the content of a belief based on that perception, the similarity need not be a matter of 
both mental states having conceptual content. 
The conceptualist might object further that only something that is conceptually structured can justify beliefs; so if 
perceptual experience justifies beliefs, then perceptual content must be conceptually structured. In response, the 
nonconceptualist can say that all we need for experience to play a justificatory role is that its content is propositionally 
structured. But content can be propositionally structured without being conceptually structured. Moreover, there are 
reasons to question whether something must be propositionally structured in order to provide evidence. 
In sum, there is good reason to understand perceptual content and perceptual capacities as nonconceptual. The thesis 
that perceptual content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities allows for a substantive way of analyzing 
perceptual content as nonconceptual. However, the thesis is also compatible with understanding (at least some) perceptual 
capacities as conceptual capacities. Indeed, one of the benefits of analyzing perceptual content as constituted by perceptual 




I have developed an asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual capacities. The asymmetry stems from the primacy 
of the employment of perceptual capacities when the capacities fulfill their function over their employment when they fail 
to fulfill their function. The analysis is counterfactual, since (subtleties aside) one qualifies as possessing a perceptual 
capacity only if one would be in a position to discriminate and single out a particular of the type that the capacity 
functions to single out, were one perceptually related to such a particular. Moreover, the analysis is externalist insofar as 




Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1984). 
Austin, J.L. 1946. “Other Minds.” Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 20: 148-187. 
——1970. “Ifs and Cans”. Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., J.L. Austin. London: Oxford University Press. 
Ayala, F. 1970. “Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology.” Philosophy of Science 37: 1–15. 
Barrett, H. C., and R. Kurzban. 2006. “Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate.” Psychological Review 113: 628–
47.  
Block, N. 1978. “Troubles with Functionalism.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9: 261-325.  
Brandom, R. 1994. Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Burge, T. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121. 
Carruthers, P. 2006. The Architecture of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Chalmers, D. 2006. “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” Perceptual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Chomsky, N. 1995. “Language and Nature.” Mind 104: 1–61.  
Coltheart, M. 1999. “Modularity and Cognition.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3: 115–20.  
Craver, C. 2007. Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Craver, C. and Darden, L. 2013. In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries across the Life Sciences. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Cummins, R. 1985. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
——2011b. “Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 1–40. 
Davidson, D. 1987. “Knowing One’s Own Mind.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 60: 441-58. 
Dennett, D.C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
DeRose, K. 2009. The Case for Contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Devitt, M. 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Dretske, F. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
——1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. and Frankish, K. 2009. In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Fodor, J. 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
——1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——1990. “A Theory of Content, I & II.” In A Theory of Content and Other Essays, ed. J. Fodor, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.   
Frankish, K. 2009. “Systems and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal Distinction.” In Two 
Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, ed. J. St. B. T. Evans and K. Frankish. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Godfrey-Smith, P. 2008. “Reduction in Real Life.” Being Reduced, ed. J. Hohwy and J. Kallestrup. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Goldman, A. 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 73: 771-91. 
Harman, G. 1990. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin. Northridge: 
Ridgeview Publishing Company. 
Hawthorne, J. 2003. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Johnston, M. 1992. “How to Speak of the Colors.” Philosophical Studies 68: 221-63. 
Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lewis, D. 1966. “An Argument for the Identity Theory.” Journal of Philosophy 63: 17-25. 
——1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell. 
——1997. “Finkish Dispositions.” Philosophical Quarterly 47: 143-58. 
Lloyd, D. 2011. “Through a Glass Darkly: Schizophrenia and Functional Brain Imaging.” Philosophy, Psychiatry and 
Psychology 18: 257–274.  
Macpherson, F. 2006. “Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience.” Noûs 40: 82-117. 
Martin, C. B. 1996. “Dispositions and Conditionals.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44: 1-8.  
McDowell, J. 1984. “De Re Senses.” The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 283-94. 
Millar, A. 2008. “Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge.” Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, 
Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Millikan, R. G. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 ——1989. “In Defense of Proper Functions.” Philosophy of Science 56: 288–302. 
Neander, K. 1991. “Functions as Selected Effects.” Philosophy of Science 58: 168–184. 
——1998. “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” 
Philosophical Perspectives 12, ed. J.E. Tomberlin. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. 
Nickel, B. 2007. “Against Intentionalism.” Philosophical Studies 136: 279-304. 
Panksepp, J. and Panksepp, J.B. 2001. “A Continuing Critique of Evolutionary Psychology: Seven Sins for Seven 
Sinners, Plus or Minus Two.” Evolution and Cognition 7: 56–80.  
Peacocke, C. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——1998. “Nonconceptual content defended.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 381-8. 
Pritchard, D. 2010. “Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination.” Noûs 44: 245-68. 
Putnam, H. 1975. “The Meaning of Meaning.” Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 1: Mind, Language, and 
Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schaffer, J. 2005. “Contrastive Knowledge.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology, eds. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Schellenberg, S. 2008. “The Situation-Dependency of Perception.” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 55-84. 
——2011. “Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 1–40. 
——2018a. “Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity”. Noûs. 
——2018b. The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Segal, G. 1996. “The Modularity of Theory of Mind.” Theories of Theories of Mind, ed. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Shoemaker, S. 1994. “Phenomenal Character.” Noûs 28: 21-38. 
Silva, A. and J. Bickle. 2009. “Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognition.” Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, ed. J. Bickle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Stanley, J. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Strevens, M. 2004. “The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – Causally.” Noûs 38: 154–179. 
Thompson, B. J. 2009. “Senses for Senses.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 99–117. 
Wright, L. 1973. “Functions.” The Philosophical Review 82: 139–168. 
 
